



LANCASTER & MORECAMBE MODEL ENGINEERING SOCIETY

SUPPLEMENT 04 - 2013

TO

RISK ASSESSMENT 2011 RA1

CONCERNING

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE STEAMING BAY CANOPY

**Original Assessment Based on HSE Guideline - HSG 216
PASSENGER – CARRYING MINIATURE RAILWAYS
(CIRCA 2001)**

Rev	Date	Purpose of Revision	Writer	Approvals
0	27.02.13	For Committee Approval	M. Sams	Presented at ??????
1	March 2016	Final Approved Document	M Sams	
A	21.03.18	Annual Review	M Hirst J Mckay	



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RISK ASSESSMENT 2011 – SUPPLEMENT 04-2013

Introduction to the Assessment Supplement 04-2013

This Supplement has been prepared for submission to the LMMES Committee to provide a documented Assessment of the likely operational issues that could arise from the installation of a weather canopy over the steaming bays, and to obtain Committee Approval of said facility from an operational aspect.

The basic premise is the installation of a three compartment structure having three curved roof sections each of 3m radius. The centre compartment would be 4.5 m wide covering 3 steaming bays and adjoining at each end a 3.25m compartment coving 2 steaming bays. The three roof sections are supported on eight columns, nominally 160 diameter by 2.5m high to the eaves. The space below the eaves is open to the elements. The roof will be of 16mm clear polycarbonate sheet. The structure will be of powder coated steel. Internal lighting is not foreseen. Rainwater drainage will spill onto the car park area and so not add to the current water loading of that area. For further detail refer to the attached drawings/schemes.

This assessment is concerned with the operational aspects, the design and manufacture will be in the hands of APEX Ltd of Southport.

Risk Assessment Process

The recommendations of HSG 216 will be re-reviewed based on Rev C of the Cinderbarrow Risk Assessment dated 2011 extracting the appropriate topics and subjects.

Annual Operational Risk Assessment – Focus on Steaming Bay Canopy

Ranking System is Event Severity to Health x Likelihood = Ranking Value. Likelihood assessment based partially on site incident history.

Ranking of 0 = Risk is Negligible due to Applied Control Action; no action required; but don't be complacent

Ranking of 1 = Risk is Low but monitor the situation

Ranking of 2 = Risk is Medium; consequence should be avoided; take further action to reduce risk.

Ranking of >3 = Risk is High; take immediate action to reduce risk.

TABLE "A" ACCESS AND EGRESS

ITEM REF:	CONSIDERATION	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE	EVENT SEVERITY 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Med 3=High	LIKE-LIHOOD 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Mod 3=High	RANKING	CONTROL ACTION
A1	Covered Steaming Bay	Inhalation of gases/fumes	2	0	0	The Steaming Bay Canopy is open on all sides and freely ventilated. There is no hazard.
A2	Escape routes	Trapped personnel.	2	0	0	The Steaming Bay Canopy is open on all sides and operatives are at ground level. There are no additional hazards for escape.
A3	Movement of Locos on Steaming Bay rails	Blocked access to manage locos	2	0	0	There are vertical support columns for the canopy between bays in 2 locations. The bays are not obstructed in a way that hinders the driver walking with a loco to the traverser end of the rails and access to the same rail is available on the opposite side to the support column in these 2 locations. Should a loco creep under own effort to the traverser end of the rails it is stopped by the hinged buffer-plate at the end of the rail.

TABLE "B" LIFTING, FALLING, DROPPED OBJECTS

ITEM REF:	CONSIDERATION	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE	EVENT SEVERITY 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Med 3=High	LIKE-LIHOOD 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Mod 3=High	RANKING	CONTROL ACTION
B1	Moving Loco's from vehicles to hydraulic lift and traverser.	Nip fingers. Trapped personnel	2	0	0	Two people to assist when unloading and moving traverser . Loco to be steadied whilst moving it and make sure Bridge Connector is lined up and pinned before movement.

TABLE "C" COLLISION AND DERAILMENT

ITEM REF:	CONSIDERATION	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE	EVENT SEVERITY 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Med 3=High	LIKE-LIHOOD 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Mod 3=High	RANKING	CONTROL ACTION
C1	Derailment	Nip Fingers. Manual Handling.	2	0	0	Ensure bridge on traverser is aligned and pinned before movement.

TABLE "D" FUEL, EXPLOSION, & CORROSIVE FLUID HAZARDS

ITEM REF:	CONSIDERATION	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE	EVENT SEVERITY 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Med 3=High	LIKE-LIHOOD 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Mod 3=High	RANKING	CONTROL ACTION
D1	Canopy Fire	Burns or injury to persons.	2	0	0	Locomotives steaming up must not be left unattended. Fire extinguisher to hand.

TABLE "E" ELECTRICAL HAZARDS

ITEM REF:	CONSIDERATION	POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCE	EVENT SEVERITY 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Med 3=High	LIKE-LIHOOD 0=Neg 1=Low 2=Mod 3=High	RANKING	CONTROL ACTION
E1	Double socket extension mounted at high level under canopy.	Electrocution	3	0	0	No electrical equipment to be left trailing or exposed to wet conditions. Extension socket can be removed from electrical system by unplugging it in the electrical room during periods of inactivity.